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TWO STANDARDS OF COMPETENCY ARE BETTER
THAN ONE: WHY SOME DEFENDANTS WHO ARE
NOT COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL SHOULD
BE PERMITTED TO PLEAD GUILTY
Jason R. Marshall*
This Note argues that the present uniform standard of competency, competence to
stand trial, be abolished in favor of two standards: competence to stand trial and
competence to plea bargain. Part I traces the history of the competency standard by
exploring its common law origins, the Supreme Court rulings that frame the de-
bate, an academic reformulation of the competency inquiry, and the interests
protected by requiring that defendants be competent to proceed through the criminal
process. Part II contrasts the cognitive abilities, capacity to communicate with
counsel, and courtroom behavior of defendants standing trial with those qualities
required of defendants pleading guilty. Part III explores specific mental illnesses
and how the symptomology of each illness determines a defendant's competence to
plead guilty or stand trial. Part IV examines the benefits and dangers of plea-
bargaining to both defendants and society and proposes a separate test for compe-
tence to plea bargain that would allow some defendants to avoid civil commitment
and its threat to liberty. Finally, this Note concludes by arguing that a multi-tiered
system provides defendants with more due process protections.
INTRODUCTION
Rulings by our nation's courts do not directly address whether a
defendant who has been found incompetent to stand trial can still
participate in a plea bargain. Rather, these rulings employ a uni-
form standard of competency, called "competence to stand trial"
[hereinafter "CST"], to determine a defendant's ability.
A uniform standard of competency provides a convenient
formula that courts can apply to adjudicate the mental fitness of
criminal defendants. Under the CST standard, when competence
is a visible issue the adjudicative process is deferred until the
defendant regains a rational and factual understanding of the
proceedings and is able to assist counsel.' There is no separate
* BA 2000, cum laude, Boston College; J.D. candidate, University of Connecticut
School of Law. A special thanks is owed to Professor Susan Schmeiser for her enthusiasm and
guidance from the earliest stages of this Note. The author is grateful to David Jellinek for his
detailed comments and encouragement. The author also wishes to thank Professor Michael
Perlin for his thoughtful insights. This Note is dedicated to Alison for her unwavering support.
1. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
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assessment for defendants seeking to resolve the criminal charges
pending against them through expeditious judgment by pleading
guilty. Thus, under the present system, criminal defendants are not
assessed according to the particular capacities needed to plead
guilty, and these capacities are not juxtaposed with the defendant's
specific mental state and functional abilities.
This uniform standard was designed to preserve due process by
requiring that defendants not only be competent to enter a guilty
plea, but also be competent to stand trial. However, the CST stan-
dard sets the due process bar too high. It fails to acknowledge that
pleading guilty generally does not require the same degree of cog-
nitive ability, communication with counsel, or behavioral control
that defendants need to stand trial. Defendants proceeding to trial
are faced with demands and complex decisions that often exceed
the stresses and choices faced by defendants pleading guilty.
Medical advances in understanding mental health diagnoses il-
lustrate exactly how mental illness can affect the courtroom
behavior and cognitive and communicative abilities of defendants,
the dispositive factors in assessing competency. Commentators rec-
ognize that forensic clinicians have significantly increased their
ability to tailor competency evaluations according to the tasks re-
quired of criminal defendants in a particular case. A uniform
standard of competency ignores and disregards these medical ad-
vances. It does not properly put the defendant's mental state in
context and is too narrow to accommodate the varying stages of
judicial proceeding.
In a criminal justice system that largely fails (or chooses not) to
recognize the complexity of the competency issue, civil commit-
ment exists as a default for judges who are required to make
difficult competency determinations applying the uniform stan-
dard. This can produce harsh outcomes for both the criminal
defendant and the rest of American society. Under this standard, a
significant number of defendants are found incompetent and are
subsequently committed. Although not convicted of a crime, these
defendants are often placed in highly secure facilities without privi-
leges enjoyed by "patients" who do not have pending criminal
charges. This deprivation of liberty is appropriate where public
safety would be threatened by a less restrictive confinement. How-
ever, the broad CST standard can potentially lead to severe
2. Mental health practitioners, often psychiatrists and psychologists, experienced in
evaluating disorders of the mind.
3. See THE EVOLUTION OF MENTAL HEALTH LAw 312-13 (Lynda E. Frost & RichardJ.
Bonnie eds., 2001).
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deprivations of liberty not justified by a criminal conviction, and
therefore poses a threat to the due process rights of the very same
defendants it was designed to protect.
Similarly, the present system militates against the potential bene-
fits of plea bargaining. By avoiding the risks and expenses of trial,
plea bargaining confers a number of important benefits both on
defendants and on our society. It is a vehicle by which the defense
and prosecution can quickly dispose of the criminal case to the satis-
faction of both parties (particularly in cases where the defendant's
act is not at issue). Trial courts likewise benefit from clearing
crowded dockets. The uniform standard of competency is overinclu-
sive, and postpones some criminal cases that could be swiftly
resolved to the advantage of all parties-defendants, prosecutors,
society, and the administration ofjustice.
A uniform competency standard also puts our society at risk.
There are some circumstances in which criminal defendants are
not competent to stand trial but also not civilly committable be-
cause they are a danger neither to themselves nor to others. Thus,
rather than securing conviction through plea bargaining, the
criminal case is deferred while an alleged criminal offender is free,
perhaps subject only to conditions of bail.
This Note proposes that the uniform standard of competency be
abolished in favor of two competency standards, CST and "compe-
tence to plea bargain" [hereinafter "CPB"]. While several
academics have also suggested a more flexible competency stan-
dard, there has not been enough discussion about the relationship
between plea bargaining and competency.4 This is both surprising
and troubling, considering the substantial number of criminal
cases resolved through plea bargaining. By arguing for a separate
CPB standard, this Note expands on the work of scholars who have
4. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Re-
stated Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571, 591
(1995) ("The criminal justice system ... should adopt a flexible standard of competency,
requiring only that the defendant possess the abilities that are necessary in the particular
case."); Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical Reformulation,
10 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 291, 294 (1992) ("[C]ompetence in the criminal process is best viewed
as two related but separable constructs, not as an open-textured single construct .... I draw
a distinction between a foundational concept of competence to assist counsel, and a con-
texualized concept of decisional competence.").
5. According to the most recent statistics provided by the U.S. Department of Justice,
in 2000, 879,000 felony cases were resolved through guilty pleas in state courts and 68,156
felony cases were resolved through guilty pleas in federal courts. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS § 5,
available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/section5.pdf (on file with the Univer-
sity of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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defined circumstances in which decisions made by defendants
pleading guilty to criminal charges are less taxing than those re-
quired at trial.6
Replacing the uniform standard with two separate competency
tests also pays proper respect to individuals with mental illness by
identifying how their specific symptoms affect the appropriateness
of a formal adjudication. In other words, it better utilizes the skills
of forensic clinicians by providing them with more guidance in
their assessment of cognitive ability, communication with counsel,
and courtroom behavior. Additionally, a separate test for CPB safe-
guards criminal defendants from the loss of liberty through civil
commitment and helps to fulfill society's desire and the courts'
mandate to resolve criminal matters expeditiously.
Part I of this Note traces the history of the competency standard;
it looks at the common law origins of the incompetency doctrine,
the Supreme Court rulings that frame the competency debate, an
academic reformulation of the competency inquiry, and the inter-
ests protected by requiring that defendants be competent before
proceeding through the criminal process. Part II contrasts the
cognitive abilities, capacity to communicate with counsel, and
courtroom behavior required of defendants proceeding to trial
with those qualities required of defendants pleading guilty. Part III
explores specific mental illnesses and how the symptomology of
each illness determines a defendant's competence to plead guilty
or stand trial. Finally, Part IV examines the benefits and dangers of
plea bargaining to both defendants and society, and proposes a
separate test for CPB that would allow some defendants to avoid
civil commitment and its threat to liberty.
I. HISTORY AND PRESENT STANDARD
A. Due Process Inherited
English common law courts gave birth to the modern incompe-
tency doctrine out of concern for legal formalism.7 Beginning as
6. See Winick, supra note 4, at 590-92; Robert L. Denney & Timothy F. Wynkoop,
Clinical Neuropsychology in the Criminal Forensic Setting, 15 J. HEAD TRAUMA REHABILITATION
804, 812 (2000) ("[P]leading guilty will require less cognitive skills than a lengthy trial. Be-
fore concluding a defendant's competency, one must have a sense of what demands will be
placed on him or her through the particular legal proceedings.").
7. See NORMAN G. POYTHRESS ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR
STUDIES 39 (2002).
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far back as the 14th century, defendants could be tried only after
entering a plea of guilty or not guilty to the charges leveled against
them.' When defendants "stood mute" rather than answering to
the charges, the courts did not proceed to trial but rather under-
took an investigation to determine if the defendant was "mute of
malice" or "mute by visitation of God."9
A finding of "mute by visitation of God" referred to defendants
who were deaf, mute, or insane.0 These defendants were excused
from trial on account of their physical or mental condition." A
finding of "mute of malice" consisted of defendants whom the
courts believed were capable of understanding the charges but
wanted to avoid trial and its potentially unpleasant outcome. 12 In
medieval times, courts compelled these defendants to enter a plea
by employing several unpleasant methods at their disposal. Most
often, courts employed a technique known as peine forte et dure,
which called for the placement of increasingly heavy weights on
the defendant's chest until he entered a plea. 13 Other methods in-
volved starvation or confinement in a small cell. 4
Although it was initially conceived to conform to the require-
ments of entering a plea, the doctrine of incompetency to stand
trial matured to resemble modern competency standards. Com-
mon law courts began to focus on the capability of a defendant to
participate meaningfully in his defense, and to understand the
pending criminal charges. 5 The depth and specificity with which
18th century courts inquired into the competence of defendants is
remarkable. As the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards
observed,
Common law judges in the eighteenth century were, in retro-
spect, "surprisingly sophisticated" in the evidence they received
8. Id. See also GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE
COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 120 (2d ed.
1997); PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAW 264 (Michael G. Fisher ed., 2d ed. 1991).
9. POYTHRESS, supra note 7, at 39; MELTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 121.
10. POYTHRESS, supra note 7, at 39; MELTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 121.
11. POYTHRESS, supra note 7, at 39; MELTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 121.
12. POYTHRESS, supra note 7, at 39; APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 8, at 264.
13. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 8, at 264; MELTON ET AL., supra note 8, at
120-21. See also ARTHUR MILLER, THE CRUCIBLE 125 (Penguin Books 1995) (1952) (refer-
encing the pressing to death of Giles Corey during the 1692 Salem "Witch Trials").
14. See POTHREss, supra note 7, at 39.
15. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 8, at 264; MELTON ET AL., Supra note 8, at
121; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMMITTEE, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 160-61 (1986) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
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to adjudge the issues of incompetence: they considered many
of the factors still used today to determine competence, in-
cluding the defendant's medical history, military and social
background, behavior and appearance at trial, and testimony
from lay and professional witnesses who knew or had ob-
served the defendant.
16
In special competency hearings, twelve-man juries assessed the
competence of defendants based on this evidence. 17 Defendants
found incompetent were incarcerated until they became fit to pro-
ceed to trial while defendants found competent proceeded to
trial."' Thus, while common law courts never advanced the term
"due process" as the basis for establishing competency hearings, it
is clear that they shared modern concerns about preserving the
dignity of the criminal justice system.
Although judges rather than juries conduct competency hear-
ings in the present-day United States, CST inquiries have come to
dominate the criminal process. With an estimated 25,000 to 60,000
evaluations for CST performed annually in the United States, CST
evaluations have been called "the single most significant mental
health inquiry pursued in the criminal justice system .... ,19
B. Setting the Bar: The Supreme Court's Competency Standard
1. Dusky, Pate, and Drope-The standard for evaluating CST has
not changed significantly since 1960, when the United States
Supreme Court articulated the definition of a competent
defendant in Dusky v. United States.20 According to Dusky, judges
may not ascertain competency based only upon the finding that
"the defendant [is] oriented to time and place and [has] some
recollection of events."21 Implicating due process, this landmark
ruling held that "the test must be whether he has sufficient present
16. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 160-61.
17. SeeAPPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 8, at 264.
18. See id.
19. Patricia A. Zapf & Jodi L. Vijoen, Issues and Considerations Regarding the Use of As-
sessment Instruments in the Evaluation of Competency to Stand Tial, 21 BEHAV. ScI. & L. 351, 352
(2003); see also Richard Rogers et al., Recent Interview-Based Measures of Competency to Stand
Thal: A Critical Review Augmented with Research Data, 19 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 503, 503 (2001); Paul
G. Nestor et al., Competence to Stand Trial: A Neurophsychological Inquiry, 23 LAw & HuM. BE-
HAV. 397, 397 (1999).
20. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
21. Id. at 402.
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ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.
22
This opinion differs substantially from many of the momentous
rulings handed down by the Court. First, the entire opinion is less
than a half-page long. Second, it is a per curium opinion, thereby
lacking the style, substance and analysis that is characteristic of an
opinion authored by a specific justice. Last, this new competency
test, which sets the constitutional bar for trying defendants, was not
an invention of the Court. As the Dusky opinion reveals, this test
was formulated by the Solicitor General and adopted word-for-
word by the Court.
2
When the Court revisited the issue of competency almost six
years later, in Pate v. Robinson,24 it implied that trying an incompe-
tent defendant was a violation of due process. Justice Clark,
authoring the majority opinion, wrote that "[t]he State concedes
that the conviction of an accused person while he is incompetent
violates due process .... ,,25 Pate held that a criminal defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial requires that a competency
hearing be held when there is "bona fide doubt" about a defen-
26dant's competency. As Professor Stephen J. Morse noted, Pate
"cement[ed] the constitutional status of the prohibition against
trying an incompetent defendant."
27
In Drope v. Missouri,2s a unanimous Court clarified the Dusky test
and the duty of trial judges to safeguard incompetent defendants
from adjudication. Defendants are prohibited from proceeding to
trial if they do not possess "the capacity to understand the nature
and object of the proceedings against [them], to consult with
counsel, and to assist in preparing [their] defense." 29 To this end,
trial judges have an ongoing duty to observe the defendant for evi-
dence suggesting incompetency.3° Although there are "no fixed or
immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further in-
quiry to determine fitness to proceed," judges must monitor the
22. Id. See infra note 65 and accompanying text for Professor RichardJ. Bonnie's inter-
pretation of "rationality" after Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
23. See Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
24. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
25. Id. at 378.
26. Id. at 385.
27. StephenJ. Morse, Involuntary Competence, 21 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 311, 313 (2003).
28. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
29. Id. at 171.
30. Id. at 181.
SUMMER 2004] 1187
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
behavior of defendants throughout the trial process and use their
judgment to decide if an evaluation for competency is warranted.'
All jurisdictions in the United States adhere to the two-pronged
competency test established by Dusky and refined in these subse-
quent decisions. A judge must evaluate: (1) the defendant's
capacity to understand the charges and nature of the criminal pro-
ceedings; and (2) the defendant's ability to assist counsel in
defending against the charges. The Dusky test is followed verbatim
by a number of state statutes and courts, while others deviate from
32the exact wording but conform to its constitutional mandates.
2. Godinez v. Moran-The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Godinez v. Moran3 3 to resolve divisions among the federal circuit
courts and state courts of last resort over the competency standard
required for defendants to plead guilty or waive counsel 4 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Godinez that Dusky did not
provide sufficient due process protection for some mentally chal-
lenged defendants. 5 Following the lead of courts that applied a
heightened standard to defendants seeking to waive constitutional
rights, the Ninth Circuit had held that defendants needed to pos-
sess the capacity for "reasoned choice" among the avenues
available to resolve the pending charges. 6
Reaffirming its uniform standard of competency, the Supreme
Court held in Godinez that the level of competence required for
defendants to plead guilty or waive their right to counsel is no
greater than that required to stand trial.37 Thus, the Dusky stan-
dard-rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and
ability to assist counsel-satisfies due process when the defendant
is seeking to waive any constitutional right. In analyzing the differ-
ences between pleading guilty and going to trial, the majority
reasoned that "while the decision to plead guilty is undeniably a
profound one, it is no more complicated than the sum total of de-
cisions that a defendant may be called upon to make during the
course of trial., 3 The Court explicitly reminded states that, al-
though due process is satisfied when a defendant has passed the
31. Id. at 180.
32. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 121; Winick, supra note 4, at 576-77;
POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 7, at 1. See also Mo. REv. STAT. § 552.020 (2003); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1367 (West 2000); Mora v. State, 814 So. 2d 322, 327 (Fla. 2002); Corn. v. Robbins,
727 N.E. 2d 1157, 1161 (Mass. 2000).
33. 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
34. Id. at 395-96.
35. Id. at 397.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 399.
38. Id. at 398.
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Dusky test and been found fit to stand trial, states could enact more
stringent requirements for assessing a defendant's competence to
plead guilty or waive counsel. 9 Last, the Court avoided a precise
dissection of the Dusky standard, but it expressly rejected the no-
tion that competency evaluations need to be a context-based
inquiry tailored to the specific decisions a defendant will be asked
to make in adjudicating the criminal charges and the defendant's
mental fitness.40
Justice Blackmun, in an impassioned dissent, rallied around the
mental health practitioners on the front lines and perhaps laid the
groundwork for a future modification of the competency standard,
including this Note's proposal. Rejecting the majority's interpreta-
tion of Dusky as simplistic, Blackmun echoed the writings of
progressive law professors and forensic clinicians who argued that
competency was a context-based inquiry.41  Observing that
"[c]ompetency for one purpose does not necessarily translate to
competency for another purpose," Blackmun rejected the majority's
deviation from the Court's precedent that competency evaluations
be tailored to the proceeding at hand 2 Considering the degree to
which questions about competency permeate the criminal justice
system, it is not surprising that scholars have joined Blackmun over
the last ten years in criticizing the majority's uniform standard of
competency.4
Shortly after Godinez, at least one academic was reluctant to in-
terpret the decision as establishing a unitary standard for all
criminal competency inquiries. Professor Bruce J. Winick seemed
to view Godinez as standing for the narrow proposition that due
39. Id. at 402.
40. See id. ("While psychiatrists and scholars may find it useful to classify the various
kinds and degrees of competence ... the Due Process Clause does not impose these re-
quirements."); see also David L. Shapiro, Ethical Dilemmas for the Mental Health Professional:
Issues Raised by Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 177, 180-81 (1997) ("The
Godinez decision was quite unusual in that the majority rejected the concept... that compe-
tence is tied to specific functions to be performed .... [T]he Godinez Court noted and
rejected this in a rather 'cheap shot' at mental health professionals . .
41. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 413 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. See Michael L. Perlin, Beyond Dusky and Godinez: Competency Before and After Tial, 21
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 297, 299 (2003) (observing that Godinez may have clarified competency but
was "misguided"); Shapiro, supra note 40, at 182 (1997) (Godinez deviates from the "accepted
standard of care" charged to practitioners evaluating defendants for competency); see also
Jennifer w. Corinis, Note, A Reasoned Standard for Competency to Waive Counsel after Godinez v.
Moran, 80 B.U. L. REv. 265, 283-84 (2000); Michael L. Perlin, "Dignity was the First to Leave":
Godinez v. Moran, Colin Ferguson, and the Trial of Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendants, 14 BE-
HAY. Sci. & L. 61 (1996) [hereinafter Perlin, Dignity].
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process may not require a higher standard for CPB than CST.44 Be-
cause the Court did not specifically address whether CPB could
constitute a narrower standard than CST under some circum-
stances, Winick observed that Godinez left the door open for courts
to undertake a contextual evaluation of competency.4'5 This is a dif-
ficult argument to make given the majority's explicit rejection of
tailored competency evaluations.46
3. Knowing and Voluntary-Godinez made clear that two inquiries
are involved in evaluating the constitutionality of a guilty plea.47
The first inquiry requires that defendants be evaluated for CST
under the Dusky standard.4 8 The second inquiry, informed by the
Court's jurisprudence, calls for an analysis of whether the guilty
plea is "knowing and voluntary.
49
Given the many fundamental rights waived by defendants who
plead guilty-the right to a jury trial, the privilege against self-
incrimination, and the right to confront accusers, among others-
the Court may have been concerned that its lengthy discussion
about CST would cause some courts to blur "rational and factual
understanding" with "knowing and voluntary." Accordingly, the
Court articulated the purpose of requiring two inquiries:
The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant's mental
capacity; the question whether he has the ability to understand
the proceedings. The purpose of the "knowing and voluntary"
inquiry ... is to determine whether the defendant actually
does understand the significance and consequences of a par-
ticular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced. °
Godinez makes it more difficult for criminal defendants to waive
constitutional rights because they need an actual understanding of
the constitutional rights they are waiving-as opposed to just the
ability to understand these rights.5' This more stringent requirement
44. Winick, supra note 4, at 590.
45. Id. at 590-91 ("To the extent that Godinez held that courts must apply the same
standard of competency across the board, regardless of the particular issue or nature of the
case, it is open to serious criticism.").
46. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
47. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400-01.
48. See id. at 400.
49. Id. at 401 n.12; see also Santobello v. NewYork, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) ("The plea
must, of course, be voluntary and knowing. . .
50. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n.12.
51. See Christopher Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Fiduciary
Duty to Clients with Mental Disability, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1581, 1590 (2000) ("After Godinez
... if the defendant waives any constitutional rights, he or she must not only have the
[VOL. 37:41190
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applies with equal force to defendants standing trial. Earlier in its
opinion, the Court lists circumstances in which defendants who
proceed to trial can relinquish these same constitutional rights by
electing to take the witness stand and waive their privilege against
self-incrimination, selecting a bench trial instead of a jury trial, or
declining to cross-examine accusers. Thus, all defendants who
waive a constitutional guarantee, whether pleading guilty or not,
may need to meet this higher threshold of understanding rights
waived.
C. Professor Bonnie's Approach
In 1992, Professor Richard J. Bonnie proposed a novel theory
for assessing competence that is frequently cited by academics and
practitioners examining the issue of competency in the criminal
process. 3 Bonnie argued that competence should be evaluated us-
ing two separate but related constructs: competence to assist
counsel and decisional competence.54
Under Bonnie's reformulation, competence to assist counsel en-
compasses all of the requirements that a defendant, at minimum,
must possess in order to proceed.5 Due process is satisfied upon a
showing that the defendant has the capacity to: (1) understand the
charges, the purpose of the criminal process and the adversary sys-
tem, especially the role of defense counsel; (2) appreciate his
situation as a defendant in a criminal prosecution; and
(3) recognize and relate pertinent information to counsel concern-
ing the facts of the case.5 According to Bonnie, and following Dusky
capacity to understand, but must actually understand, the consequences of the waiver
decision and arrive at the decision voluntarily.").
52. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398.
53. RichardJ. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical Reformulation,
10 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 291 (1992); see, e.g., Morse, supra note 27, at 314; Denise L. Mumley et
al., Five Year Research Update (1996-2000): Evaluations for Competence to Stand Trial (Adjudicative
Competence), 21 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 329, 330 (2003); Richard E. Redding & Lynda Frost, Adjudi-
cative Competence in the Modern Juvenile Court, 9 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 353, 359-60 (2000); Ian
Freckelton, Rationality and Flexibility in Assessment of Fitness to Stand Trial, 19 INT'LJ. L. & Psy-
CHIATRY 39, 49-50 (1996); Ronald Roesch et al., Conceptualizing and Assessing Competency to
Stand Trial: Implications and Applications of the MacArthur Treatment Competency Model, 2 Psy-
CHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 96, 103-04 (1996).
54. See Bonnie, supra note 4, at 294.
55. See id. at 297.
56. See id.
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and ancient common law, adjudication is barred when defendants
are unable to assist counsel in their defense. 5v
Decisional competence concerns the specific choices defendants
must make throughout the adjudicative process."8 Unlike many de-
cisions made by attorneys, these are choices that only defendants
can make: decisions such as whether to plead guilty, or whether to
waive certain constitutional rights.59 Accordingly, in some situations
a defendant may be found competent to assist counsel but not
competent to make these weighty decisions. ° Lack of decisional
competence, in contrast to inability to assist counsel, does not nec-
essarily preclude adjudication. This is because Bonnie views
decisional competence as a context-dependent inquiry. In other
words, whether decisional competence is required depends on the
decisions that a defendant is required to make at that particular
stage of the criminal justice process. Thus, defendants who do not
seek to waive any constitutional protections are not required to
63possess decisional competence.
Bonnie revisited his theory after Godinez and observed that the
Court rejected his two-tiered framework in favor of a single stan-
dard that absorbed the concept of decisional competence. 4 He
interpreted the Court's jurisprudence as mandating the following
requirements for a defendant to be decisionally competent:
(1) A capacity to understand information relevant to
the specific decision at issue;
(2) A capacity to appreciate the significance of the deci-
sion as applied to one's own situation;
(3) A capacity to think (logically) about the alternative
courses of action; and
(4) A capacity to express a choice among alternatives.
Perhaps trying to make sense of an opinion that has left many
questions unanswered, Bonnie contended that collectively this list
"operationalize[s] the 'rationality' requirement" that the Court
addressed in Godinez.65
57. See POYTHRESS, supra note 7, at 47.
58. See Bonnie, supra note 4, at 298.
59. See infra note 76.
60. See Bonnie, supra note 4, at 298.
61. See id. at 302.
62. See id. at 305-07.
63. See id. at 308-11.
64. See POYTHRESS, supra note 7, at 47-48.
65. Id. at 48.
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Some commentators who adhere to Bonnie's contextual compe-
tency formulation have argued that adjudication can also hinge on
the complexity of the case.6 For example, while a defendant may be
able to understand the proceedings and what facts to share with
counsel in a misdemeanor or common felony case, the same defen-
dant might be overwhelmed if charged with a more complicated
crime such as conspiracy or fraud.67 Under this theory, the cognitive
ability of a criminal defendant is a variable that must be considered
in any competency evaluation.68
D. Interests Protected by the Competency Requirement
With physical liberty at stake, both courts and individual criminal
defendants have a strong interest in ensuring that only competent
persons are allowed to proceed through the criminal justice system.
This interest is also a fundamental right. The Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, applied to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that
defendants must receive a fair trial.66 It violates due process to con-
vict defendants whose mental impairments prevent them from
communicating exculpatory or mitigating information to their at-
torneys.76 Trying incompetent defendants or accepting guilty pleas
from them could produce a significant number of erroneous convic-
tions, something with which all individual defendants are obviously
concerned.'
The defendant's liberty interest in not being tried while incom-
petent converges with society's concern for preserving the sanctity
66. See Freckelton, supra note 53, at 50; Redding & Frost, supra note 53, at 360-61.
67. See Freckelton, supra note 53, at 50; Redding & Frost, supra note 53, at 360-61.
68. See Freckelton, supra note 53, at 50.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, XIV. See Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954) ("The
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment is for a fair trial . .. no trial can be fair that
leaves the defense to a man who is insane ... ."); see also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540
(1965); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) ("No right ranks
higher than the right of the accused to a fair trial.").
70. See Corinis, supra note 43, at 270; see also Bonnie, supra note 4, at 295 ("To proceed
against a defendant who lacks the capacity to recognize and communicate relevant informa-
tion to his or her attorney and to the court would be unfair to the defendant and would
undermine society's independent interest in the reliability of its criminal process."). The ABA
Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards qualifies this statement by emphasizing that, to
relate these facts, criminal defendants need an actual understanding, even if it is minimal
one, of the proceedings, the critical nature of presenting defenses, and differences that
would result from conviction or acquittal. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 170.
71. See Winick, supra note 4, at 575-76.
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and fairness of the criminal process. First, both individual defen-
dants and society have an interest in what Bonnie calls "client
autonomy"--decisions that attorneys cannot make for the defen-
dant, such as how to plead, whether the case should be tried before
a jury or judge, and whether the defendant will take the stand.72
Second, all persons subject to the criminal law have a stake in
avoiding erroneous convictions. Arbitrary systems of justice leave
everyone vulnerable to unjust sanctions. Indeed, the criminal jus-
tice system would splinter if public confidence in the reliability of
the law were undermined. 3 Third, if an incompetent defendant
were wrongly convicted, the perpetrator actually responsible for
the crime would remain undetected and at liberty to commit addi-
tional offenses. Last, the conviction and sentencing of incompetent
defendants who fail to appreciate that punishment is being im-
posed for their wrongdoing runs contrary to our tenets ofjustice.4
II. FACULTIES REQUIRED To PROCEED: COMPETENCE To PLEA
BARGAIN (CPB) Vs. COMPETENCE
To STAND TRIAL (CST)
Permitting defendants to plead guilty when they might not be
competent to stand trial is justified by three major differences be-
tween the faculties and conduct of defendants pleading guilty and
defendants proceeding to trial: (1) cognitive ability; (2) commu-
nication with counsel; and (3) courtroom behavior. While these
differences are enumerated separately for ease of discussion, they
are closely related and may overlap depending on a particular de-
fendant's condition.5
A. Cognitive Ability
Defendants who choose to plead not guilty but subsequently waive
constitutional rights at trial need to possess a more meaningful
72. See Bonnie, supra note 4, at 296.
73. Professors Bonnie and Winick refer to this as preserving the "dignity" of the crimi-
nal process. See Bonnie, supra note 4, at 295; Winick, supra note 4, at 576.
74. See Corinis, supra note 43, at 270.
75. See, e.g., Karen E. Whittemore et al., An Investigation of Competency to Participate in
Legal Proceedings in Canada, 42 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 869, 872-73 (in small sample of 76 pa-
tients, all individuals found unfit to stand trial were determined incompetent to plead guilty
under Canadian legal standards).
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understanding of the rights waived because they are called upon to
make more complex decisions about their defense. 6 Godinez
requires all defendants to have an actual understanding of the
constitutional rights they waive and therefore due process is only
satisfied when defendants are specifically evaluated for this
understanding." If a defendant standing trial waives his right to a
jury in favor of a bench trial, for example, the trial court must
ensure that the defendant understands why it is advantageous to
discard trial by jury. This is not to say that every nuance of the
defense needs to be understood.78 Indeed, there are many strategic
decisions that defendants can make in collaboration with their
attorneys.79 However, if autonomy is truly part of the due process
calculation, defendants alone must decide to waive constitutional
rights at trial. Surely the accompanying analysis of this process
demands greater cognitive abilities.8 °
Defendants who plead guilty, on the other hand, should only be
required to demonstrate a rudimentary understanding of the
rights being waived. Of primary importance to defendants plead-
ing guilty is the reduced sentence they will receive through plea
bargaining and the maximum penalty they are subject to at trial.
Thus, to borrow from the above example, there is no need for
these defendants to grasp a significant understanding of the bene-
fits of a bench trial as opposed to a jury trial because these
defendants are competent to understand that the deal offered by
the prosecution is more advantageous than any trial. Winick briefly
addressed the futility of holding defendants who plead guilty to the
same standard as defendants at trial:
76. For example, a criminal defendant may choose to waive one or more of the follow-
ing rights, among others: right to a trial by jury, right to remain silent and right to confront
one's accusers.
77. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 163-64 (while the unitary standard does not
require clinicians to "adjust" their evaluations depending on if the defendant will plead
guilty or not, clinicians should "quiz" defendants about their understanding of rights waived
by pleading guilty). It is unclear whether this inquiry into understanding of rights waived is
embedded in plea colloquies conducted by judges when considering whether a guilty plea is
rendered knowingly and voluntarily.
78. For instance, the author agrees with Bonnie's example that a defendant who waives
ajury trial need not understand jury selection and peremptory challenges. See Bonnie, supra
note 4, at 308.
79. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398.
80. In fact, a recent article in the Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation categorically
stated that "pleading guilty will require less cognitive skills than a lengthy trial." Denney &
Wynkoop, supra note 6, at 812. Unfortunately, this statement was not accompanied by any
supporting empirical data.
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[A] complete understanding of the criminal prosecution is
unnecessary in the overwhelming majority of cases that are re-
solved by a guilty plea. Defendants who plead guilty do not
need a high level of understanding concerning the trial proc-
ess, because they will not participate in it. ... [I] n a
substantial number of cases, mentally ill defendants, like de-
fendants generally, are probably guilty and lack a credible
defense. For these defendants, a guilty plea is almost always
the best option."'
Godinez settled the issue that defendants pleading guilty need to
have the ability to understand the constitutional rights waived and
actually understand what these rights are meant to protect. "2 How-
ever, the minutiae of constitutional rights waived-for example,
whether a bench trial would be advantageous given the complexity
of charges and presence of scientific evidence, the calculated pros
and cons of taking the stand in one's own defense, which prosecu-
tion witnesses should not be cross-examined-exceeds the scope of
understanding required to satisfy due process for defendants
pleading guilty.
The fact that understanding the constitutional rights waived
plays a less significant role in plea bargained cases is illustrated by
the typical interplay between judges and defendants proffering
guilty pleas. When a defendant pleads guilty, a court's function as
gatekeeper is to ensure that the defendant understands the ramifi-
cations of a guilty plea.3 To this end, judges are generally required
to question defendants who plead guilty. 4 The primary focus of
this questioning, however, is not on a defendant's waiver of specific
constitutional rights but on whether the defendant understands
the causal relationship between pleading guilty and adjudication.
In other words, defendants must understand that a guilty plea will
result in a conviction, leaving them vulnerable to incarceration and
collateral consequences such as criminal fines, deportation, and
registration as a sex offender.8 5
81. Winick, supra note 4, at 590.
82. See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
83. See, e.g., Montana v. Garner, 36 P.3d 346, 355-56 (Mont. 2001).
84. See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
85. There are, of course, some cases in which a judge will suspend a guilty finding by
the court conditioned on the defendant's completion of a particular course of action (e.g.,
staying out of trouble, attending drug and alcohol program, or making restitution).
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B. Communication with Counsel
A defendant's capacity to interact with counsel and relate perti-
nent information can profoundly influence the outcome of both
plea bargains and trials. For defendants pleading guilty, facts and
descriptions of the alleged crime and any involvement in the of-
fense help their attorneys assess the strength of the prosecution's
case and can give them leverage in plea negotiations. Attorneys
assisting defendants who stand trial will also rely on the informa-
tion provided by their clients, constructing a defense around the
facts and influencing their questioning of witnesses.
As Bonnie points out, the degree to which ability to communi-
cate with counsel will affect adjudication depends on the nature of
the individual case, with specific attention paid to the complexity
of criminal charges and whether the defense attorney will actually
need information from the defendant. 6 In general, however, there
are two factors that distinguish the level of attorney-client interac-
tion needed for defendants pleading guilty from that needed for
defendants standing trial: (1) testimony at trial, and (2) amount of
detail needed concerning the alleged criminal offense.
Testimony at trial refers both to statements made on the stand by
the prosecution's witnesses and to statements made by defendants
should they take the stand. Many defendants, likely on advice from
their attorneys, decline their constitutional right to testify on their
own behalf. Nevertheless, a number of defendants determine that it
is in their best interest to take the stand. Because the prosecution
will, in most cases, aggressively cross-examine these defendants, they
need to possess a greater recollection of the events and understand-
ing of the process than their counterparts pleading guilty. In
addition, before taking the stand, defendants must have communi-
cated more extensively with counsel to ensure that they anticipate
questioning and formulate responses. With regard to the prosecu-
tion's witnesses, a defendant's ability to relate information that
would allow counsel to discredit witnesses or identify false state-
ments under oath is crucial to any effective trial defense. Thus,
generally, more active participation is required of defendants who
proceed to trial.
Similarly, attorneys preparing for trial typically need more
intricate details of the crime, related events, and any defense, than
do counsel for a defendant pleading guilty. When attorneys are
86. See Bonnie, supra note 4, at 302.
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working in concert with their clients toward a plea bargain, facts
are important if they weigh against what might be considered the
proper sentence or if they can be used as bargaining chips to
secure greater leniency. However, the nuts and bolts of the
circumstances surrounding a criminal offense are not as essential
because a plea bargain by definition avoids the open adversarial
process, the forum through which opposing counsel dissects and
packages the events with an eye toward undermining the other
party's case.
Perhaps the best support for the claim that limited communica-
tion with counsel does not violate due process is that advanced by
courts presented with defendants claiming amnesia. Amnesiac de-
fendants are not per se incompetent to stand trial or plead guilty."
To determine competency in light of amnesia, courts will consider
whether counsel is able to adequately retrieve evidence about the
crime in substitution for the defendant's description of events.8
Under some circumstances, the prosecution may even be required
to fill in the gaps of defense counsel's knowledge about the crime
by allowing unfettered access to its case files.8 9 Courts will also
weigh the strength of the prosecution's case and the importance of
the defendant's own report to counsel in mounting a proper de-
fensef 0 Thus, if defendants may be permitted to proceed through
the criminal process even though they cannot relate any pertinent
information to counsel due to amnesia, mentally ill defendants
who are likewise unable to communicate any relevant facts or
whose communication with counsel is severely limited should not
be precluded from disposing of their criminal cases through plea
bargaining.91
87. See, e.g., State v. Kleypas, 40 P.3d 139 (Kan. 2001); York v. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. Wyn, 490 A.2d 605 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985); State v. McClendon,
437 P.2d 421 (Ariz. 1968); Bradley v. Preston, 263 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1967); see generally
Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Amnesia as Affecting Capacity to Commit Crime or Stand Tria,
46 A.L.R. 3d 544 (1972).
88. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
89. See United States v. Stubblefield, 325 E Supp 486, 486 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).
90. See Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Bonnie, supra note 4, at
302 ("Under the prevailing judicial practice, the legal significance of a (genuine) claim of
amnesia is determined in light of the strength of the evidence in the particular case; adjudi-
cation is barred only if there is a significant possibility that the defendant would have been
able to produce evidence raising a reasonable doubt about guilt."); THOMAS GRIsso, EVALU-
ATING COMPETENCIES 76-77 (1986).
91. As a good illustration of how factors relating to competency overlap, a recent
neuropsychological study suggested that the capacity to remember specific events is closely
linked with cognitive ability. Nestor et al., supra note 19, at 399-400, 408.
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C. Courtroom Behavior
The way in which defendants conduct themselves publicly is far
more relevant to standing trial than to participating in a plea inter-
rogation.2  At trial, a mentally ill defendant's disruptive or
distracting conduct could prejudice the factual determination of a
jury or judge.9 Similarly, a defendant who is not sufficiently in con-
trol of his speech or body movements will likely not be able to
testify effectively on his own behalf, thereby affecting his right to
receive a fair trial.94
These due process considerations are eliminated where defen-
dants have accepted a plea bargain. A defendant who pleads guilty
relieves the state of its obligation to prove guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. Thus, the trial judge sits not as a factfinder but as a
gatekeeper to ensure that the defendant's plea has been offered
knowingly and voluntarily.9  The defendant's behavior cannot
prejudice the determination of guilt or innocence, although it can
influence the judge's decision as to whether the defendant is in
fact competent to plead.9 6 Likewise, the potential for depriving a
defendant of the right to a fair trial when he cannot adequately
take the stand in his own defense is obviated by the defendant's
waiving the opportunity for exculpation.
There are additional characteristics unique to trial that also
justify a higher standard of competency for defendants who do not
adjudicate their charges through plea bargaining. One difference
is the lapse of time between indictment and resolution of the
criminal charge. 97 Depending on the length of trial, a mentally ill
defendant might become disruptive under the stresses and
92. There is no clear consensus among commentators as to whether courtroom behav-
ior should be part of the competency equation. Bonnie, for instance, contends that the issue
of disruptive defendants is more appropriately thought of in terms of competency to be
present. Bonnie, supra note 4, at 315-16. Other commentators squarely place courtroom
behavior among the factors to consider in assessing CST. See, e.g., MELTON ET AL., supra note
8, at 122-23; GRISSO, supra note 90, at 77.
93. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 123 ("[A] defendant who will disrupt and dis-
tract the factfinding process may prejudice the factfinder and make defense counsel's job
difficult .... ).
94. Id. ("[A] defendant who is incapable of testifying, even though able to talk to the
attorney in private, may be deprived of a fair trial.").
95. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
96. Indeed, the Supreme Court held in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), that trial
courts are required to order a competency hearing if suspicious that the defendant is not
mentally fit. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
97. See Gmisso, supra note 90, at 77 (including "probable length of trial" among list of
variables relevant to competency to stand trial).
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demands of trial. Similarly, a trial's emotionally charged
atmosphere may trigger destructive behavior in the defendant. 9s
III. THE CPB STANDARD ILLUSTRATED: How MENTAL ILLNESS
SYMPTOMS MAY PERMIT DEFENDANTS To PLEA BARGAIN
EVEN IF NOT COMPETENT To STAND TRIAL
There exists a general and often emphatic consensus that men-
tal illness should not be conflated with incompetency.99 Although
there is an undeniable link between individuals diagnosed with
mental illness and legal incompetence, ' °° competency is a case-
specific inquiry in which the defendant's cognitive and communi-
cative impairments should be juxtaposed with the requirements of
the legal process at hand.01
98. See id. (including "potential of trial to arouse emotion" on list of variables relevant
to competency to stand trial). Because Grisso also includes a defendant's network of social
support in this list, the author assumes that the presence of loved ones or capable practitio-
ners can mitigate the effects that length of trial and emotion may have on a defendant's
behavior.
99. See, e.g., State of Missouri v. Elam, 89 S.W.3d 517,521 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) ("The ac-
tual presence of some degree of mental illness ... does not necessarily indicate legal
incompetence for purposes of trial. ... [A] defendant may be diagnosed with a mental dis-
ease and still be declared competent to stand trial."); Morse, supra note 27, at 316
("Whether a defendant is incompetent to stand trial and whether a defendant suffers from
mental disorder are distinct issues."); Jodi Vijoen et al., An Examination of the Relationship
Between Competency to Stand Trial, Competency to Waive Interrogation Rights, and Psychopathology,
26 LAw & HUM BEHAV. 481, 500 (2002) ("[D]uring formal evaluation, mental health profes-
sional should be careful not to equate mental illness with competency.");Robert A.
Nicholson & Karen E. Kugler, Competent and Incompetent Criminal Defendants: A Quantitative
Review of Comparative Research, 109 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 355, 356 (1991) ("[N]either severe
mental illness nor mental retardation, in and of itself, renders a person unfit for trial.");
APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 8, at 220 ("The mere presence of... mental illness or
disability is insufficient in itself to constitute incompetence.").
100. See Morse, supra note 27, at 316 (citing research confirming the link between per-
sons suffering from mental illness and incompetence); Zapf, supra note 19, at 353
("Certainly, the issue of an individual's mental status is inherently tied to competency status
..... "); Robert E. Cochrane et al., The Relationship Between Criminal Charges, Diagnoses, and
Psychological Opinions Among Federal Pretrial Defendants, 19 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 565, 567 (2001)
(citing specific mental disorders and corresponding high rates of incompetence).
101. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS xxiii (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM IV] (additional information
beyond clinical diagnosis needed to assess competency, possibly including the defendant's
"functional impairments" and what is required of the defendant); Nicholson & Kugler, supra
note 99, at 356 ("[T]he crucial issue is whether an existing disorder or deficiency impairs an
individual's functional ability to understand his or her legal situation and assist an attor-
ney."); GRISSO, supra note 90, at 76 (a determination of competency "should include a
consideration of the attorney-client circumstances and probable trial demands in the instant
case.").
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In other words, competency assessments should be tailored to
the mental health of the defendant, and to the minimum func-
tional abilities needed to proceed through a specific phase of the
adjudicative process. When applying this theory to a defendant
pleading guilty, a forensic assessment would seek only to determine
whether the defendant possesses a rudimentary understanding of
the constitutional rights being waived and a limited ability to
communicate with counsel.
2
Forensic clinicians have the ability and tools at hand to tailor
competency inquiries according to the adjudicative criminal fo-
rum, whether trial or plea bargain. Since the latter half of the
twentieth century, many competency assessment instruments have
been developed, with increasing sophistication, to assist clini-
cians. O3 In general, instruments reflect the shared desire among
clinicians and academics for tailored competency assessments.
Summing up the focus of competency instruments, one researcher
noted that:
In developing these instruments, considerable effort has been
directed to deconstructing competence into relevant content-
specific cognitive abilities that are quantifiable and measur-
able. These cognitive abilities have been broadly defined to
include not only basic information processing capacities of
encoding, retention, and retrieval of factual, court-related
knowledge, but also abilities related to reasoning and com-
prehension that are presumably linked to the rational aspects
of competence.... [P]erhaps the most challenging of these
efforts has been directed toward deconstructing the social
demands of competence that are often embodied in the ca-
pacity of the defendant to participate with legal counsel and
104to appreciate the general social context of the courtroom.
By concentrating on the factors relevant to pleading guilty, cog-
nitive ability and communication with counsel, the current
competency assessment instruments lay the foundation for creating
a separate evaluation of CPB.
102. See discussion supra Part II.
103. See Zapf & Viljoen, supra note 19, at 353; Nestor et al., supra note 19, at 398; see gen-
erally Mumley et al., supra note 53; POYTHRESS, supra note 7; Richard Rogers et al., Recent
Interview-Based Measures of Competency to Stand Trial: A Critical Review Augmented with Research
Data, 19 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 503 (2001).
104. Nestor et al., supra note 19, at 398.
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The following examination of three mental health disorders-
schizophrenia, depression, and paranoid personality disorder-
demonstrates the need for a separate competency assessment for
plea bargaining, and illustrates how it might work. As stated above,
the presence of mental illness is not dispositive in determining
competency. Rather, findings of incompetency hinge on the clinical
evaluation of the severity of the particular disease.' 05 Accordingly,
the following analysis of these mental illnesses predicts the way in
which symptoms present in an individual would affect the compe-
tency assessment.
A. Schizophrenia
A number of studies have demonstrated that persons suffering
from schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders have the highest
rates of impaired ability to stand trial.0 6 Even among defendants
who have been diagnosed with other psychotic disorders, schizo-
phrenics exhibit greater impairment.'0 7 The broad range of
symptoms that are characteristic of schizophrenia shed some light
on these findings.
The American Psychiatric Association, in its Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV), classifies the symptoms
that characterize schizophrenia as "positive" and "negative."0° The
positive symptoms-delusions, hallucinations, disorganized think-
ing and speech, grossly disorganized behavior and catatonic
behavior-seem to encompass some of the popular perceptions
about schizophrenia.' °9 The DSM IV summarizes positive symptoms
as "appear[ing] to reflect an excess or distortion of normal func-
tions. '""" Conversely, negative symptoms are reported to "reflect a
diminution or loss of normal functions.""' As such, they may re-
strict the range and intensity of emotional expression, the fluency
105. To simplify the application of competency tests to a specific mental illness, the dis-
cussion of schizophrenia, depression, and paranoid personality disorder will work from the
presumption that defendants present with only one mental health disorder. For example,
although persons with schizophrenia have been found to suffer also from depression in
some cases, for the purposes of this Note, individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia will not
suffer from any other distinct mental illness.
106. See, e.g., PovTHRESS, supra note 7, at 98; Viljoen et al., supra note 99, at 495; Cochrane
et al., supra note 100, at 577; Nicholson & Kugler, supra note 99, at 364.
107. See Viljoen et al., supra note 99, at 497.
108. DSM IV, supra note 101, at274.
109. See id. at 274-76.
110. Id. at 274.
111. Id.
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and productivity of thought and speech, and the initiation of goal-
directed behavior.
1 2
Like other chronic illnesses, schizophrenia is characterized by
periods of diminished infirmity and active symptoms." 3 The active
phase is defined as a "relatively severe constellation of signs and
symptoms" and typically includes psychotic disturbances such as
delusions, hallucinations, and disorganized behavior. 
4
Schizophrenics who suffer from delusions misinterpret "percep-
tions or experiences.. '" 5 Often, delusional schizophrenics believe
they are being persecuted."" The persecutor may take the form of
an EB.I. agent or otherworldly being that has implanted a tracking
device for some malicious reason."' Delusions may also be religious
in nature."" For example, a criminal defendant may seek to plead
guilty because he thinks he is an angel and that God will not allow
him to be incarcerated.
Auditory hallucinations are more commonly reported by schizo-
phrenics than are visual hallucinations."9 The DSM IV notes that
these hallucinations are "usually experienced as voices ... familiar
or unfamiliar ... [and] are perceived as distinct from the person's
own thoughts.' 2 Another positive symptom, disorganized thinking
and speech, has been strictly defined by the DSM IVas a symptom
that "must be severe enough to substantially impair effective com-
munication." 2' Disorganized thinking and speech may present in
one or more of the following ways: a person switches without asso-
ciation from one topic to another; questions are answered with
scarcely related or completely unrelated responses; or speech is so
disorganized that it ceases to be understandable.
2 2
Grossly disorganized behavior generally presents in a person's
outward conduct and appearance. This symptom may manifest it-
self through unusual dress, such as when a person wears winter
attire on a scorching summer day, inappropriate sexual behavior
like public masturbation, or sudden unprovoked agitation typified
112. Seeid.at275.
113. See id. at 278; SAMUELJAN BRAKEL & ALEXANDER D. BROOKS, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY
IN THE CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM 83 (2001).
114. DSMIV supra note 101, at 277; see also BRAKEL& BROOKS, supra note 113, at 83.
115. DSM IV, supra note 101, at 275.
116. See id.
117. BRAKEL & BROOKS, supra note 113, at 84.
118. DSMIV supranote 101, at 275.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 276.
122. Id.
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by shouting or swearing. 123 Catatonic motor behaviors refer to a
broad range of conduct that is both passive and active. Those exhib-
iting these behaviors may be unresponsive to their surroundings,
may aggressively resist orders to move, or may have purposeless and
unstimulated body movements.1
24
Negative symptoms refer to functional deficiencies. One common
physical symptom is described as a combination of poor eye contact,
reduced body language, and an expressionless face. 2 5 Another nega-
tive symptom, called "poverty of speech," is characterized by "brief,
laconic, empty replies.' 2' The DSM IVnotes that poverty of speech,
as a deficiency, is different from a conscious decision to provide shal-
low answers.121
Given the broad range of debilitating symptoms suffered by in-
dividuals with schizophrenia, the high correlation between the
disorder and incompetency is not surprising. Even with the sepa-
rate standard of legal competence proposed by this Note for
defendants pleading guilty, a significant number of defendants
found not competent to stand trial would also likely be found not
competent to plead guilty.28 However, because competency is a
case-specific inquiry, forensic determinations depend on the sever-
ity of symptoms. Researchers examining the relationship between
mental illness and competence listed "disorientation and impaired
memory, poor judgment, thought and communication distur-
bances, hallucinations, delusions, and bizarre, unmanageable
behavior" as the symptoms largely determinative of a defendant's
fitness to stand trial.
129
Defendants less impaired by schizophrenia, while incompetent
to stand trial, could still meet the due process requirements of
pleading guilty. First, forensic evaluations for CPB need not
include judgments about the defendant's behavior. Whether a
defendant exhibits "bizarre, unmanageable" behavior, or the range
of conduct listed in the DSM IV under "grossly disorganized
behavior" and "catatonic motor behaviors," is inconsequential
when a defendant concedes guilt. These would be important





127. Id. at 277.
128. See Whittemore et al., supra note 75, at 872-73 (reporting small research sample
showing that all individuals found not fit for trial were not competent to plead guilty under
Canadian competency standards).
129. Nicholson & Kugler, supra note 99, at 364-65.
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to testify effectively in his own defense could prejudice the
factfinder.1
°
Second, symptoms of schizophrenia affecting communication-
poverty of speech, reduced body language and expressions, disor-
ganized thinking and speech-are less material to pleading guilty.
Unlike their counterparts proceeding to trial, defendants who ac-
cept a plea bargain avoid many of the necessary interactions
between attorney and client at trial, such as preparing for the de-
fendant's testimony or disputing the credibility of the prosecution's
witnesses.131 Similarly, recollection of the alleged incident is less
important because pleading guilty precludes the need for a de-
fense strategy built around the facts of the case.13' Thus, although a
defendant with schizophrenia may have a reduced capacity to
communicate with counsel, in many cases the defendant would
have to be severely impaired for a clinician assessing CPB to find
that this requirement is not met. For example, defendants choos-
ing to plead guilty must be able to clearly communicate this
preference to the trial court or may not be deemed to have know-
ingly and voluntarily waived their constitutional rights.
Lastly, defendants pleading guilty generally need only possess a
surface level understanding of the constitutional rights being
waived. 3 3 In some cases, this lower standard will permit adjudica-
tion through plea bargaining. Nevertheless, the high rate of
cognitive impairment demonstrated by persons diagnosed with
schizophrenia predicts a strong correlation between incompetence
to stand trial and incompetence to plead guilty.
34
Hallucinations and delusions could also play a factor in CPB
assessments for schizophrenics. A guilty plea influenced by a voice
inside the defendant's head commanding him to plead guilty would
probably not constitute a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights.
Likewise, with respect to delusions, a defendant who accepts a plea
bargain because God has empowered him with the ability to liquefy
and slip through prison cells would not meet the Dusky standard for
rational understanding of the proceedings. Interestingly, however,
130. See discussion infra Part III.B.
131. See discussion infra Part III.B.
132. See discussion infra Part III.B.
133. See discussion supra Part III.A.
134. See Viljoen et al., supra note 99, at 497 ("In comparison to defendants with other
types of psychotic disorders ... defendants with schizophrenia demonstrated considerably
more impairment on legal abilities. This finding is consistent with the high rates of cognitive
and functional impairment in individuals with schizophrenia.").
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delusions may be less likely to render a defendant incompetent to
stand trial than hallucinations."
5
B. Depression
Defendants diagnosed with mood disorders'-most commonly
Major Depressive Disorder ("depression") and Bipolar Disorder-
have low rates of incompetence to stand trial.' 3 7 Although many
studies examining the relationship between competency and men-
tal illness utilize the umbrella term "mood disorders" rather than
undertake a separate inquiry of depression and Bipolar Disorder,
when considered independently, persons with depression were
found to be far less legally impaired than those with Bipolar Disor-
d er. 1 
s
According to the DSM IV, persons may be diagnosed with de-
pression after experiencing at least one Major Depressive Episode
absent the manic behavior that characterizes Bipolar Disorder. 
3 9
Symptoms may include psychosis, although the DSM IV cautions
that this may suggest an alternative diagnosis, such as Schizoaffec-
five Disorder, to more accurately reflect the patient's condition.'4
About half of those who experience an isolated episode will ex-
perience a second episode. 14' For individuals who have experienced
more than one episode, the recurrence of symptoms is case-
specific, with some having "clusters of episodes" while others ex-
perience more frequent episodes or enjoy many years of dormant
symptoms.1
42
The DSM V defines an episode as five or more depressive symp-
toms persisting for at least two weeks. 43  There are nine
characteristic symptoms of depression;' 4 some are more relevant to
135. See id. at 497-98 ("[E]xisting studies have generally found that impairment in the
ability to stand trial is highly correlated with the psychotic symptoms of conceptual disor-
ganization and hallucinations, whereas delusions appear to have a weaker and more isolated
influence.").
136. Depression is labeled both as a mood disorder and an affective disorder. See, e.g.,
DSMIV, supra note 101, at 317; Viljoen et al., supra note 99, at 498.
137. See Viljoen et al., supra note 99, at 498; Cochrane et al., supra note 100, at 575;
Nicholson & Kugler, supra note 99, at 359-60.
138. See Viljoen et al., supra note 99, at 495, 498.
139. See DSM IV supra note 101, at 339.
140. See id.; BRAKEL & BROOKS, supra note 113, at 88.
141. SeeDSMI, supranote 101,at 341.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 320.
144. Id. at 327.
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legal competency than others. The first two symptoms-frequently
depressed mood, and diminished interest and pleasure in activi-
ties-are most important to those in the mental health field
because the presence of at least one of these symptoms is necessary
to diagnose depression.'45 However, the fifth and eighth symp-
toms-diminished ability to think or concentrate and psychomotor
retardation-appear to play the most significant role in determin-
ing CPB for persons diagnosed with depression.
146
The first symptom, depressed mood, is manifested in a variety of
ways. Some individuals may verbally complain about feeling sad,
hopeless, anxious, or even wholly devoid of any feelings at all.
4 7
Others may focus on body pains and aches, articulating these
physical ailments instead of emotional suffering.4 8 Depressed
mood also presents itself in a number of persons as increased irri-
tability.' 49 As examples, the DSM IVnotes that irritability might take
forms such as "persistent anger, a tendency to respond to events
with angry outbursts or blaming others, or an exaggerated sense of
frustration over minor matters.",
15
0
Loss of interest is the second symptom. It may include losing
pleasure in activities that used to be enjoyable, apathy, or social
withdrawal.15 ' Appetite changes and sleep disturbances are the third
and fourth symptoms, respectively. Changes in appetite can take two
extreme directions: an increase in appetite, which may lead to severe
weight gain, or a decrease in appetite, which may cause the person
to lose a substantial amount of weight.152 Although persons with de-
pression more frequently experience insomnia, some may suffer
from hypersomnia or oversleep.
53
The fifth symptom is listed as psychomotor agitation or
retardation. Examples of agitation include "the inability to sit still,
pacing, hand-wringing, pulling; or rubbing of the skin, clothing or
other objects." 154 Retardation may manifest as "slowed speech,
thinking, and body movements; increased pauses before answering;
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 320.
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speech that is decreased in volume, inflection, amount, or variety of
content, or muteness."
55
Symptom six is fatigue or loss of energy. The DSM IV notes that
"[a] person may report sustained fatigue without physical
exertion.... The efficiency with which tasks are accomplished may
be reduced. '"56 Symptom seven-feelings of worthlessness or
excessive or inappropriate guilt-causes individuals to overstate
perceived faults and failings and blame themselves for events to
which they are only tenuously connected or not connected at all .
The eighth symptom is diminished ability to think, concentrate,
or make decisions. 58 Persons presenting this symptom "may appear
easily distracted or complain of memory difficulties.' 59 The final
symptom for depression involves recurring thoughts of death and
contemplation of suicide.' 60 In fact, as many of fifteen percent of
those diagnosed with depression take their own lives. 6'
As with schizophrenia, those diagnosed with depression are not
uniformly impaired in their ability to plea bargain or stand trial.
Rather, legal competence depends on the severity of the depressive
symptoms and how they present in a particular person. 62 In most
cases, defendants diagnosed with depression are often not im-
paired to the degree necessary to justify a finding of incompetence
to stand trial. Although the number of depressed defendants
deemed incompetent to proceed to trial might be relatively low
compared to defendants suffering from other mental health diag-
noses, depressive symptoms still prevent a number of defendants
from adjudicating the criminal charges pending against them at
trial. Based on the symptoms that characterize depression, some of
these "incompetent" defendants could benefit from a separate CPB
standard.
One of the major differences between evaluations for CPB and
CST is that a defendant's behavior is not relevant to pleading
guilty. Consequently, a depressed defendant found incompetent to
stand trial might be permitted to plea bargain if the competency
finding was based in part on the forensic clinician's concern that
angry outbursts or strange behavior could compromise the defen-




158. Id. at 322.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 340.
162. See id. at 322 ("The degree of impairment associated with a Major Depressive Epi-
sode varies....").
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The other primary factors determining whether a defendant
found not competent to stand trial can plead guilty are the degree
to which cognitive functions and the ability to communicate with
counsel are impaired. Some depressed defendants are limited in
their ability to think, deliberate about an issue, or make choices.
There may also be a loss of short-term memory, or frequent distrac-
tions.163 The degree to which diminished motivation affects these
cognitive dysfunctions is unclear.' 6" Nonetheless, a "widespread im-
pairment of cognitive functions in... depressed patients" has been
documented. 165 Furthermore, the severity of depression may not be
indicative of the degree of cognitive impairment.1 66
In the legal context of pleading guilty, cognitive dysfunction
could affect a defendant's ability to knowingly and voluntarily de-
cide that it is in his best interest to accept a deal from the
prosecution and forgo a trial and opportunity for exculpation. If
depression clouds the decision-making process, it violates due
process to allow a guilty plea. Although defense counsel may advise
their clients that a plea bargain is more advantageous than going
to trial, defendants must be able to weigh the benefits and risks of
each adjudicative forum to plead guilty and make a truly inde-
pendent waiver of constitutional rights. Therefore, when assessing
CPB for a defendant diagnosed with depression, the forensic clini-
cian needs to determine first if the particular defendant's illness
manifests as cognitive dysfunction and, if so, whether the impair-
ment is severe enough to prevent a rudimentary understanding of
constitutional rights waived.
Some of these cognitive impairments may also erode a defen-
dant's ability to communicate with counsel. Constant distractions
and short-term memory loss can make it difficult for attorney and
client to have a conversation. 167 A defendant's diminished capacity
to focus on the attorney's pertinent questions could inhibit the at-
torney's ability to ascertain facts that could provide the defendant
with increased leverage in plea bargaining. Similarly, psychomotor
retardation-manifested through speech that is slowed, short in
content, containing pauses before answers, or with varying tones-
would likewise limit the effectiveness of attorney-client interactions.
163. See Barbara Ravnkilde et al., Cognitive Deficits in Major Depression, 43 SCANDINAVIAN
J. PSYCHOL. 239, 247-48 (2002).
164. See id. at 239.
165. Id. at 245.
166. See id. at 246.
167. See id. at 247.
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As previously stated, communication with counsel should be
given more weight in assessments for CST, and there may be alter-
native means by which the defense attorney can reconstruct the
facts of the case. However, if the defendant's communication is so
deficient that it precludes him from having a meaningful conversa-
tion with counsel about constitutional rights waived, he would not
reach the competency threshold under CPB.
C. Paranoid Personality Disorder
The final mental illness included in this analysis, Paranoid Per-
sonality Disorder, was selected because it exemplifies diagnoses
that generally bear no relationship with cognitive function. Per-
haps this fact helps to explain findings that defendants with
personality disorders have one of the lowest rates of incompetency
to stand trial, even when compared with mood disorders)t s
There are ten specific personality disorders listed in the DSM IV.
Each disorder has its own diagnostic criteria, although some shared
features justify their grouping. Most importantly, all personality dis-
orders involve an "enduring pattern of inner experience and
behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the indi-
vidual's culture. Personality disorder can affect an individual's
seWf-perception and how events and others are interpreted and per-
ceived. 70 It can alter one's emotional responses, interpersonal
functioning, and ability to control impulses. To receive a diagnosis
of personality disorder, this enduring pattern must be "inflexible




Individuals with Paranoid Personality Disorder (PPD) suspect
the worst in other people. According to the DSM IV, PPD is charac-
terized by "pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of others such that
their motives are interpreted as malevolent.' ' 72 This lack of trust
makes those with this disorder strive for self-sufficiency, autonomy,
and control over people with whom they interact.1 73 Individuals
with PPD do not generally confide in other people or sustain close
relationships, out of fear that their disclosure will somehow harm
168. See Cochrane et al., supra note 100, at 575.
169. DSM IV, supra note 101, at 630.
170. See id. at 630-31.
171. Id. at 630.
172. Id. at 634.
173. See id. at 635.
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them in the future.1 7 4 They feel that others are making plans to at-
tack them without cause at an unpredictable time.'7 5 Those with
PPD may misinterpret neutral or even objectively kind actions as
personal attacks and may assume that others want to trick or ex-
ploit them. 76 Similarly, they will hold grudges against persons
whom they feel have demeaned them.177 Some people with PPD
may also experience short psychotic episodes, especially when un-
der stress.
78
Because the symptoms for PPD listed in the DSM IVdo not seem
to affect cognitive ability, individuals with this disorder would likely
benefit more than persons with many other mental illnesses from a
separate standard of competency for pleading guilty. For defen-
dants suffering from disorders like schizophrenia and depression,
the primary obstacle to being found competent to proceed to trial.,
or even to plea bargain, is the potential impairment of cognitive
functions needed for a rational understanding of the criminal
charges and the constitutional rights waived. Based on the symp-
toms associated with PPD, however, defendants with this disorder
would possess the surface level understanding that satisfies due
process.
In the relatively small number of cases in which a defendant with
PPD is deemed not competent to stand trial, therefore, the basis
for this judgment is probably attributable to lack of capacity to
communicate with counsel or to doubts about proper courtroom
behavior. Stress from pending criminal charges could trigger brief
periods of psychosis in an individual with PPD. This reaction, in
turn, could lead to a finding of incompetency to stand trial be-
cause the defendant's behavior would potentially jeopardize the
objectivity of the factfinding process. However, because psychosis is
not a defining feature of PPD and because episodes last only a
short time, findings of incompetence to stand trial are likely due to
communicative deficiencies.
As previously stated, individuals with PPD do not trust other
people and are constantly on guard against perceived attacks and
slights. Consequently, they try to control people around them and
prefer to be self-sufficient. These symptoms could spill over into
questions of competency because they limit the capacity of a de-
fendant with PPD to communicate with counsel. Defendants with




178. See id. at 635.
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PPD may genuinely feel that any information they share with their
attorney will be used against them. They could perceive counsel
not as an ally but as an adversary. For these reasons, a defendant
with this disorder might not disclose facts relating to the alleged
crime or may only provide guarded responses to direct questions
posed by the attorney. Consistent with the desire for autonomy,
defendants with PPD may also "choose" a course of non-disclosure
with the misguided idea that they can resolve the pending charg-
ing largely without assistance from counsel.
The "choice" made by defendants with PPD to limit communica-
tion with counsel is distinguishable from similar decisions made by
defendants without mental illness. Defendants without mental ill-
ness make a conscious choice not to communicate, unhampered
by a psychological condition and all the time retaining the capacity
to assist counsel in constructing a defense. On the other hand, a
defendant whose ability to communicate is impaired by PPD or an-
other disability lacks the capacity to interact sufficiently with his
attorney. The underlying disease impedes defendants' judgment to
the point that it is not truly their own. Analogizing to a physical
ailment, persons with severe cerebral palsy would not be expected
to run a marathon because the disease impairs control of their
body movements. Likewise, defendants with a mental illness that
impairs their ability to interact with people, like PPD, cannot be
expected to use the same judgment as other defendants.
Under the CPB standard, some defendants with PPD found not
competent to stand trial because of diminished communicative
abilities would be permitted to resolve their criminal matters expe-
ditiously by pleading guilty. Communication between attorney and
client, while important in the plea bargain process, is not as impor-
tant as it is at trial.
IV. WHY HAVE Two STANDARDS?
A. The Benefits and Pitfalls of Plea Bargaining
The need for plea bargaining had been endorsed by the Su-
preme Court long before Godinez was assigned a docket number.
179
179. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971) ("The disposition of
criminal charges by agreement between prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely
called 'plea bargaining,' is an essential component of the administration ofjustice. Properly
administered, it is to be encouraged. ... Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not
only an essential part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons.").
1212 [VOL. 37:4
Two Standards of Competency
Plea bargaining is the process by which the prosecution and de-
fense agree to a specific disposition of the criminal charges.
Generally, the defendant enters a guilty plea in exchange for the
prosecution's recommendation to the court that a lenient sentence
be imposed.
In Santobello v. New York, a case cited repeatedly by courts prais-
ing the efficacy of plea bargaining, the Supreme Court explicitly
encouraged the use of plea bargaining. 0 The majority opinion
cited many benefits that plea bargaining produces: (1) the crimi-
nal case is resolved expeditiously; (2) defendants avoid the
unproductive and negative effects of incarceration that may occur
when bail is denied or is set too high; (3) society is protected from
defendants who may commit crimes while released on bail;
(4) handing down prison sentences soon after a defendant is
charged with a crime increases the probability that the criminal
will be rehabilitated; and (5) the resources that are saved by avoid-
ing trial reduce the drain on state and federal judges and
courthouses.""i
This list of plea bargaining benefits, while impressive, cannot ac-
count for the fact that over 90% of all criminal cases are presently
resolved through plea bargaining.8 2 Perhaps the best explanation
for the prevalence of plea bargaining in the criminal justice system
is that it permits both the defense and the prosecution to avoid the
risks and uncertainty of proceeding to trial.
The prosecutor benefits by ensuring conviction while conserving
the limited resources available to punish and deter criminal acts. 83
Although the state must bargain away the maximum punishment
available under the pending criminal charges, plea bargains guar-
antee that the public interest will be served by securing some
penalty and acknowledgment of responsibility where trial may have
produced neither.8 4 This penalty can be tailored to the defendant's
180. See id. at 260.
181. See id. at 260-61.
182. See PoYTHREss, supra note 7, at 2; ROBERT A. CARP& & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL
PROCESS IN AMERICA 173 (3d ed. 1996); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OFJUSTICE, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS § 5, supra note 5.
183. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE LJ. 1979, 1980
(1992) ("The prosecutor's objective in each case is to obtain the optimum level of punish-
ment at the least cost, in order to free litigation resources for other prosecutions that can
bring additional deterrence benefits. By tailoring each plea offer to the expected costs of
trial, the likelihood of success, and the expected sentence, the prosecutor can maximize the
deterrence obtainable from the finite resources at her disposal.").
184. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, 55 STAN. L. REv. 29, 38 (1992); see also Robert E.
Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1914 (1992) (plea
bargaining avoids the "risk of a costly trial followed by acquittal").
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criminal history and the criminal act committed. Plea bargains save
prosecutors considerable time, effort, and money by avoiding the
cost of lengthy preparation and trial. Consequently, prosecutors
can accept more new cases and use the resources diverted from
plea bargaining to "get the greatest deterrent power out of limited
resources."11 Moreover, by granting prosecutors the flexibility to
reduce charges and make concessions, plea bargains achieve other
important ends. For example, inducing a defendant to cooperate
with the state may lead to the arrest and conviction of other crimi-
nals who pose a greater threat to society. 86 Plea bargaining also
shields victims from any additional trauma that might be caused by
observing and possibly testifying at trial."7
The defendant benefits from a sentence that is preferable to the
maximum sentence he might have received if found guilty by a
judge or jury. Some defendants may be able to bargain felony
charges down to a misdemeanor conviction, or avoid conviction of
an offense such as sexual assault that might have caused significant
hardship to the defendant in prison and upon release.' In addi-
tion, this swift resolution of the criminal charges limits the time
defendants spend in pre-trial lock-up when unable to post bail.'88
Another benefit that is commonly cited in support of plea bar-
gaining is that it promotes autonomy. Because defendants run the
risk of receiving the maximum sentence prescribed for the crimi-
nal offenses charged, they should be able to bargain their
constitutional protections in exchange for a more lenient punish-
ment.'" In other words, the law should not foreclose defendants'
ability to control their own fates.' 91
185. Wright & Miller, supra note 184, at 38; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining
as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1975 (1992) ("Compromise ... benefits prosecutors and
society at large. ... [P]rosecutors buy that most valuable commodity, time. With time they
can prosecute more criminals.")
186. SeeJeff Palmer, Note, Abolishing Plea Bargaining: An End to the Same Old Song and
Dance, 26 AM.J. CRIM. L. 535, 515 (1999).
187. See id. at 518. Palmer also cautions that this justification for plea bargaining has
been criticized by some on the grounds that the more lenient sentences resulting from plea
bargaining can also injure victims because they have a personal interest in seeing thatjustice
is done. See id.
188. See id. at 515 n.56 and accompanying text.
189. Seeid.at 515.
190. See Easterbrook, supra note 185, at 1975 ("Defendants have many procedural and
substantive rights. By pleading guilty, they sell these rights to the prosecutor, receiving con-
cessions they esteem more highly than the rights surrendered."); Scott & Stuntz, supra note
184, at 1914-15 ("[A) policy of contractual autonomy is the only way that parties can reduce
the social losses that result from uncertainty and frustrated expectations.").
191. See Wright & Mille, supra note 184, at 91 (citing how some view plea bargaining in
moral terms and believe that it "treats the defendant with the respect that an autonomous
human being deserves, leaving more control over the defendant's fate in his own hands.").
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Plea bargaining is not without its shortcomings. A number of
commentators have criticized plea bargaining for undermining the
accuracy of the criminal justice system and possibly leading to the
conviction of innocent defendants.192 Innocent defendants who are
risk averse, for example, are more likely to accept the offer of an
unjust sentence than risk the uncertainty of trial.'" The possibility
that an innocent defendant would plead guilty to receive a more
lenient sentence rather than seek exoneration at trial is exacer-
bated by the coercion that characterizes the plea bargaining
194process.
Many critics are uncomfortable with the large number of crimi-
nal cases resolved through plea bargaining because it undermines
safeguards provided by the adversarial system and compels defen-
dants to forgo many constitutional protections.""' After all, a guilty
plea is by definition a conviction. "6 By conceding guilt, the defen-
dant waives the right to a jury trial, the right to confront hisaccuers andthepriileg .. . . 197
accusers, and the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
The state is relieved of its obligation to rebut the defendant's pre-
sumed innocence by persuading a factfinder of the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, unlike rules of evidence
at trial, prosecutors can use hearsay statements, information and
material obtained by the police in an unlawful search, and other
evidence inadmissible at trial, to intimidate a defendant into ac-
cepting a plea bargain."""
Although prosecutors and defense attorneys are supposed to act
in the interest of justice, incentives to deviate from this objective
192. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal
Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1361, 1368-69
(2003) (Bibas concisely summarizes the observations by Albert Alschuler and Stephen
Schulhofer, two of the leading scholars with respect to plea bargaining: "plea ... bargaining
undercuts accuracy, equal treatment, fairness, and perceptions of fairness by subverting
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and other rights, thus putting innocent defendants at
risk."); see generally Schulhofer, supra note 183, at 1981-87.
193. SeeSchulhofer, supra note 183, at 1982.
194. See Palmer, supra note 186, at 519 ("The problem of convicting an innocent person
is further aggravated by the coercive elements involved in plea bargaining, such as pretrial
confinement, overcharging, and differential in sentencing between pleas and trial."); see also
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969) ("Ignorance, incomprehension, coercion,
terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats might be a perfect cover-up of unconstitution-
ality.").
195. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 192, at 1368-69; Palmer, supra note 186, at 523.
196. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242 ("A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits
that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judg-
ment and determine punishment.").
197. Id. at 243.
198. See Palmer, supra note 186, at 524 n.108 and accompanying text.
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may create conflicts of interest.9 9 The prosecution's primary goals
do not always align with the public interest. The chief prosecutor,
or District Attorney, is a political office acquired by election or ap-
pointment. With political aspirations, the District Attorney's goal is
to improve her public status and political standing. 00 Maintaining a
high conviction rate, staying on good terms with defense attorneys,
and avoiding high-profile trial losses are some of the ways to
achieve this end.2 0 ' These factors converge to create a powerful in-
centive for the District Attorney to encourage settlement through
plea bargains.0 Assistant District Attorneys, seeking to advance
their careers while also conserving time, generally want to avoid
trials because they are time-intensive and risky.2 2 For career ad-
vancement, it may also be in their best interest to help the District
Attorney get reelected or reappointed.2 4
Criminal defense attorneys, whether paid counsel or public de-
fenders, have personal incentives to encourage their clients to
accept plea offers. Most criminal defense attorneys are paid a flat
fee to resolve the case..2 '5 By rejecting a plea offer, paid counsel
must expend time and money preparing for trial at no additional
charge and to the detriment of new, paying clients. 20 6 Also, some
jurisdictions have fee arrangements that mandate higher compen-
sation for pre-trial legal work.0 7 Public defenders who are not paid
on a case-by-case basis do not share these financial incentives.
However, they do share a desire to reduce their heavy caseloads.2 8
Similarly, public defenders and paid counsel working regularly
with a county prosecutor's office might be more inclined to nego-
tiate a plea bargain that is not in their client's best interest in order
to improve their relationship with prosecutors and make their
"working environment more tolerable.
2 0 9
Another criticism of plea bargaining is that it marginalizes trial
judges.2' 0 The prosecution and defense negotiate charges and
199. Some commentators refer to this conflict of interest as "agency cost problems." See,
e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 183, at 1987-90.
200. See id. at 1987.
201. See id.
202. See id.




207. See Wright & Miller, supra note 184, at 92.
208. See Schulhofer, supra note 183, at 1989.
209. Wright & Miller, supra note 184, at 92.
210. Id. at 39 ("The clearest effect of plea bargains on trial judges is to marginalize
them.Judges have little voice in traditional plea bargains.").
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sentences that are then presented to the judge for acceptance. n
Judges are inclined to acquiesce in sentencing for several reasons.
First, the plea bargaining system, recognized as a crucial mainstay
of the criminal justice system, would collapse if agreements
negotiated by the parties were not honored. Second, judges should
avoid disturbing agreements that are acceptable to both parties in
an adversarial system. 12 Last, judges are often faced with a steady
stream of cases that leave little time to undertake careful analysis of
plea bargains that, by definition, satisfy the defense and
prosecution. 13 Likewise, time constraints also pressure the judge to
avoid trial.
These cumulative criticisms of plea bargaining shed light on the
risk that criminal defendants will forgo their right to seek exonera-
tion at trial, and agree to a plea offer that is not in their best
interests. There are, however, a number of safeguards in place to
mitigate the risks that plea bargaining will be abused. Perhaps the
most significant protection stems from the due process clause: a
guilty plea is valid only if made knowingly and voluntarily.21 4 Trial
courts typically engage defendants in plea colloquies to ensure that
this requirement is met.215 Thus, although there may be coercive
elements at play in plea negotiations, the ultimate decision to
plead guilty rests with the defendant and is usually checked by a
judge. Also, additional measures beyond the minimum protections
required by the due process clause may be enacted. For example,
211. Id.
212. Id. ("[J]udges have every reason to listen to the recommendations of the parties
and to follow the outlines of their agreement. In an adversary system, judges reason, the
judge has limited justification to upset an agreement that satisfies both parties.").
213. Id.
214. See discussion supra Part I.B.3; see, e.g., State v. Ross, 916 P.2d 405, 409 (Wash. 1996)
("The court shall not accept a plea of guilty, without first determining that it is made volun-
tarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the
consequences of the plea.").
215. The United States Supreme Court advises trial courts to conduct an examination
of the defendant upon a guilty plea to shield itself from charges by the defendant that he
was not fit to plead. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 244 n.7 (1968). Federal courts
are required to inform defendants pleading guilty, in open court, of the constitutional rights
they are waiving and determine that the defendants understands the consequences of this
waiver. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (b). Many states explicitly require that trial courts engage in
plea colloquies. See generally H.D. Warren, Annotation, Court's duty to advise or admonish ac-
cused as to consequences of plea of guilty, or to determine that he is advised thereof 97 A.L.R. 2d 549
(1964). For a standard plea colloquy, see 2 E LEE BAILEY & KENNETH J. FISHMAN, COMPLETE
MANUAL OF CRIMINAL FoRms § 48.1 (3d ed. 2003).
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in many jurisdictions, the trial court cannot accept the plea bar-
gain before finding that there is a factual basis for the guilty plea.216
More active benches will also refuse to enforce plea bargains
they believe are fundamentally unfair or run counter to public pol-
icy.2 17 In United States v. Perez, the trial judge did not recognize the
defendant's limited waiver of his right to appeal and of his right to
bring a collateral challenge to his sentence. 21s Recognizing the "se-
rious nature of the rights being waived in a plea,"2 1 Judge Gertner
held that:
Despite the attraction of the idea of maximizing a defendant's
power by allowing him to sell whatever he has, the market for
plea bargains, like every other market, should not be so de-
regulated that the conditions essential to assuring basic
fairness are undermined.... [A]ppeal waiver clauses ... are
contrary to public policy and void.
22 0
In a different example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit held that unclear plea agreements would be con-
strued to the benefit of criminal defendants. 221 Citing Santobello, the
court placed the burden of clarity on the government in recogni-
tion of the rights waived by pleading guilty and the potentially
. . 222coercive nature of plea bargaining.
Despite the drawbacks of the plea bargaining system, defendants
would not likely be better off in a legal system that imposed trials
in all cases. Robert E. Scott and William J. Stuntz concede that
"some defendants accept bad deals., 223 However, they argue that it
is unfair to put all defendants at risk of longer post-trial sentences
by abolishing plea bargaining because of "the misjudgments of a
few."224 Scott and Stuntz also advance a class-based argument in
216. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (3) ("Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the
court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5
(West 2002) ("The court shall also cause an inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy
itself that the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the
plea."); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-35-1-3 (b) (West 1998) ("The court shall not enter judgment
upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime unless it is satisfied
from its examination of the defendant or the evidence presented that there is a factual basis
for the plea.").
217. Under Rule 11(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, federal judges
have discretion to deviate from the sentence recommendation made by the prosecution.
218. United States v. Perez, 46 F. Supp. 2d 59, 60 (D. Mass. 1999).
219. Id. at 64.
220. Id. at 61.
221. SeeUnited States v. Giorgi, 840 F.2d 1022, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988).
222. See id. (citing Santobello v. NewYork, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)).
223. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 184, at 1928.
224. See id.
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support of plea bargaining. Defendants that are poor and unedu-
cated, they contend, are in the most need of competent lawyers but
often end up with the least capable attorneys.2 5 The lawyer's inabil-
ity, coupled with the defendant's limitations, may produce an
unfavorable offer and acceptance at the plea stagey. Scott and
Stuntz contend that requiring adjudication at trial exacerbates this
problem because trials demand greater attention and skill than
plea bargaining, at higher stakes. 27
Another advocate of plea bargaining, Judge Frank H. Easter-
brook, accuses those opposing the present system of "commit[ting]
the Nirvana Fallacy, comparing an imperfect reality to a perfection
achievable only in imaginary systems. '228 Deception can take place
at trial as well as in plea bargaining.22 9 Trial rules, however, may ex-
clude evidence that sheds light on a defendant's innocence that
would be available to prosecutors at the bargaining stage. In this
manner, plea bargaining may be more conducive to protecting in-
nocent defendants from conviction than would trials because
prosecutors are more competent than the common jury pool and
are in a better position to verify the information provided by law
enforcement and the defense.
Despite the criticisms of plea bargaining, there is no indication
that it will be abolished at any point in the near future. The risk
that defendants might plead guilty to a crime they did not commit
is a danger inherent in the plea bargaining process. Society, how-
ever, values the benefits of plea bargaining over the possible
conviction of innocent defendants. With safeguards in place to
mitigate this risk, plea bargaining continues to play a crucial role
in the administration of justice and provides defendants with the




227. See id. Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, in response to criticisms of the plea bargaining
system, writes in part:
When a defendant's lawyer fails to make an important motion or omits an essential line of
arguments, we treat the omission as a forfeiture. How bizarre for a legal system that rou-
tinely puts persons injail for twenty years following their agents' oversight to deny them the
right to compromise the same dispute, advertently, for half as much loss of liberty!
Easterbrook, supra note 185, at 1977.
228. Easterbrook, supra note 185, at 1976.
229. Id. at 1971.
230. See id. Some examples cited by Easterbrook are witnesses unwilling to testify be-
cause of fear and information supplied in confidence.
231. See id. at 1971-72.
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B. The Importance of Expeditious Adjudication
A criminal justice system that incorporates a separate standard
of competency to plead guilty would represent a much-needed al-
ternative to the present adjudicative process. Under the current
system, a finding of incompetence to stand trial triggers state civil
commitment statutes or similar provisions that allow states to in-
voluntarily detain individuals.32 In most cases, the criminal
adjudication is deferred pending the defendant's restoration of
competence and the defendant is confined to a maximum-security
hospital, perhaps for a long period of time. 3
Furthermore, even within these maximum-security institutions,
patients with pending criminal charges might be singled out for
more restrictive confinement than other civilly committed persons,
such as being segregated in a locked unit of the hospital and ex-
cluded from therapeutic outings sponsored by the hospital.3 The
highly restrictive nature of this confinement implicates the due
process clause. Without ever having been-convicted of committing
a criminal act, the defendant is placed in a facility that more closely
resembles a penal institution than the rehabilitative and therapeu-
tic environment in which other patients are placed.
In Jackson v. Indiana, the Supreme Court limited the power of
states to indefinitely commit an accused declared incompetent to
stand trial. The criminal defendant in Jackson was found not
competent to stand trial and had been confined in a mental insti-
tution for three-and-one-half years. 36 An Indiana statute compelled
232. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123 § 16(c)(2002); Robert D. Miller, Hospitalization of
Criminal Defendants for Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial or for Restoration of Competence:
Clinical and Legal Issues, 21 BEHAV. ScI. & L. 369, 372 (2003) (citing survey finding that most
states had mechanisms in place to detain incompetent defendants against their will).
233. See Perlin, Dignity, supra note 43, at 63 (" [1]f it is unlikely that the defendant will
regain his competency in the 'foreseeable future' (a category reserved for the most seriously
mentally impaired), it is most likely that he will be committed to a secure forensic hospital
for a lengthy stay (in many cases, a lifetime commitment)."); POYTHRuss, supra note 7, at 50
("[D]efendants are committed for restoration of competence, usually to a forensic hospital
.... "); Winick, supra note 4, at 580 ("Many of the hospitals in which defendants are con-
fined are maximum security institutions that are poorly funded and staffed."); MELTON ET
AL., supra note 8, at 131 (noting that in 1994 more than half the states did not require peri-
odic judicial review of defendants found incompetent). The option of outpatient treatment
for incompetent defendants is available under some circumstances. However, it is cautioned
that this option is often overlooked or disregarded. See Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 51,
at 1624 n.198; Winick, supra note 4, at 580.
234. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 131 (defendants may be "confined in a secure
'forensic' facility and provided with fewer privileges").
235. 406 U.S. 715 (1971).
236. See id. at 718-19.
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its state courts to civilly commit criminal defendants to psychiatric
hospitals until deemed fit to proceed to trial. 23 7 Because medical
evidence suggested that the criminal defendant in Jackson would
never regain competency, the statute amounted to an indefinite
criminal commitment without the procedural protections available
in civil proceedings.5 8
The Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment made it unconstitutional to confine the accused based
solely on incompetence to stand trial.23 9 Rather, due process re-
quires that the continued commitment of a criminal defendant can
be justified only for a reasonable period of time of treatment and
must be grounded by progress towards the goal of regaining com-
petency 4 ° Commitment at this pre-trial stage comports with due
process because the defendant is shielded from criminal prosecu-
tion when he is not mentally fit to proceed to trial.24' After this
period has expired, however, a state must either release or civilly
commit the individual.242
Even with the due process protections enumerated in Jackson,
the danger of long-term commitment persists. A survey of state
statutes published more than twenty-years after Jackson demon-
strated that many states had disregarded the Court's directives.4 3 A
summary of the survey's findings stated that:
Four states permitted commitment of incompetent defen-
dants only under civil commitment laws, but 15 states
imposed a lengthy treatment period, tied the maximum
commitment to the sentences for the crimes charged, or cre-
ated special classes of incompetent defendants with different
commitment or release criteria. Statutes in another 14 states
permitted indefinite commitment of permanently incompe-
tent defendants.
244
Furthermore, confinement under a state's civil commitment
statutes may still lead to long-term detainment in a maximum-
security hospital. A visit to one of the maximum-security "hospitals"
that house defendants deemed not competent to stand trial makes
237. See id. at 720.
238. See id. at 725-26.
239. Seeid. at 731.
240. See id. at 738.
241. See People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Colo. 1994).
242. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.
243. Miller, supra note 232, at 372.
244. Id.
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clear that this commitment is civil in name only. The restrictive na-
ture of detainment is punitive and analogous to the criminal
confinement expressly forbidden in Jackson.
Civil commitment laws typically require that an individual be a
danger to self or others before the state intervenes. 45 Many states
have safeguards in place to prevent the unnecessary deprivation of
liberty. After an individual is civilly committed, hospital staff is of-
ten required to periodically review the patient and submit
recommendations for continued commitment. However, because
individuals are committable as long as they are deemed a danger to
themselves or others, they can be placed in a forensic hospital in-
definitely. Consequently, patients with pending criminal charges
may be at greater risk of having their civil commitment extended
because their alleged criminal acts could make clinicians and
judges more inclined to label them dangerous."'
Given the restrictive nature of civil commitment and potential
for long-term detainment, prosecutors have been accused of abus-
ing the competency inquiry by using it to detain defendants when
guilt is difficult to prove.24' For this reason, highly secure mental
institutions have been called an "alternate place to do time., 24s In
fact, some courts have sentenced defendants who had been placed
in mental facilities for significant periods of time to "time served,"
perhaps in recognition of the punitive nature of the confine-
ment.249 Prolonged civil commitment is a particularly harsh
consequence for those accused of misdemeanors because convic-
tion of the offense would likely only have resulted in the payment
of a small fine or probation.2 50 Defense attorneys have also been
accused of misusing the competency doctrine, asking the court to
order an evaluation as pretext for designing a trial strategy of men-
tal nonresponsibility or to assist them in plea negotiations or
251mitigation of sentence in case of conviction.
Moreover, some studies have suggested that competency evalua-
tions and the resultant civil commitment process are used as a
"back door" to impose mental health treatment on individuals who
245. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-497 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126 (2003).
246. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 131.
247. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 163-64; see also State ex rel. Haskins v.
County Court of Dodge Cty, 62 Wis. 2d. 250, 258-59 (1974) (civil commitment of criminal
defendant amounted to the "custodial warehousing of an individual who cannot be appro-
priately dealt with by the criminal law.")
248. HENRY STEADMAN, BEATING A RAP?: DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO STAND
TRIAL 104 (1979).
249. See id.
250. Winick, supra note 4, at 580.
251. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 163; GRISSO, supra note 90, at 65.
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would not otherwise meet the danger to self or others require-
ment.2 152  In a related but less obvious theory about the
consequences of misusing competency evaluations, Winick argued
that findings of incompetence stigmatize criminal defendants.
2 3
Along with changing other people's perceptions of them, this
stigma may cause "[i]ndividuals ... to think that their difficulties
cannot be helped ... [and] can impede successful treatment."
25 4
These feelings could lead to symptoms that mirror depression.
The hazards inherent in delaying the criminal process are tangi-
ble. A separate inquiry for CPB is needed to provide criminal
defendants with more due process protections. A blanket policy
that segregates patients with pending charges in the most secure
• • 256
areas of maximum-security hospitals is overinclusive. Instituting a
separate competency standard for pleading guilty would allow a
number of criminal defendants to circumvent the civil commit-
ment process. By pleading guilty, some defendants accused of
committing minor or non-violent offenses could avoid the stigma
and severe deprivation of liberty tied to findings of incompetency
to stand trial.
Restrictive confinement in a maximum-security hospital would
certainly be justified for offenders who are mentally ill and pose a
heightened risk of violence. However, the punitive nature of this
detainment mandates that efforts be made to secure a criminal
conviction before imposing this severe deprivation of liberty. Indi-
viduals should be able to earn time during this period of
confinement and a separate standard of competency to plead
guilty helps to achieve this end. Under the present adjudicative
system, some courts do consider time spent in maximum security
hospitals during sentencing, but most statutes do not require that
individuals be credited for the years spent languishing in hospitals
while civilly committed.' 7 When defendants plead guilty and are
convicted of a serious offense, the state still reserves the power to
252. Mumley et al., supra note 53, at 330-31; GRIsso, supra note 90, at 65. The standard
model for these studies consists of documenting the correlation between defendants
charged with minor offenses such as disorderly conduct and referral for CST.
253. Winick, supra note 4, at 581-82.
254. Id. at 581.
255. Id. at 582.
256. See id. at 580.
257. Id. Some states require that criminal charges are automatically dismissed after a pe-
riod of years, usually tied to the maximum sentence the defendant would have received if
convicted of the most serious crime charged. See, e.g., MAss GEN Laws ch. 123, § 16(0(2002).
Even after the dismissal of charges, however, defendants may still be detained against their will
under civil commitment statutes.
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strictly confine these individuals and impose treatment if necessary.
The significant distinction, however, is that states would not be al-
lowed to do this at the expense of the defendant's due process
rights.
One anticipated criticism of allowing defendants to plead guilty
when they are incompetent to stand trial is that it would encourage
plea bargaining and its inherent risks.258 Fearing the uncertainty of
civil commitment, some defendants may be more inclined to admit
guilt and start serving their sentence. The risks of coerced plea
bargaining, however, do not outweigh the benefits of a separate
competency standard for plea bargaining. First, the vast majority of
cases are adjudicated through plea bargains anyway: the induce-
ment is already there. The possibility of civil commitment may
provide the prosecution with more leverage during plea negotia-
tions, but the significant benefits that states derive from avoiding
trial gives the prosecution an incentive to offer a deal that is attrac-
tive enough to be accepted. Second, the fact that many defendants
regain CST quickly mitigates the likelihood that plea bargains will
be haphazardly accepted. In most cases, trial commences within six
months of a finding of incompetency to stand trial.259 There is no
pressing need to accept a deal from the prosecution that deviates
from the standard offer for comparable allegations if long-term
civil commitment is unlikely. Last, there are a number of safe-
guards in place to protect against the coercion that is associated
160with plea bargaining.
CONCLUSION
Ironically, in light of the objections to creating a separate stan-
dard for CPB, a multi-tiered system provides defendants with more
due process. Defendants would avoid the severe deprivation of lib-
erty triggered by civil commitment statutes and similar provisions,
and some would be protected from "accepting" a plea offer when
they are not competent to make this decision.
The present uniform standard is adverse to the moral dignity
that the American justice system is supposed to embody. The
criminal justice system is heavily biased towards plea bargaining,
not trial, and therefore defense attorneys, prosecutors, and trial
258. See supra notes 192-213 and accompanying text.
259. POYTHRESS, supra note 7, at 51.
260. See supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
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judges are more likely to accept proposed plea bargains rather
than calibrate for competency. Concerns about the defendant's
mental fitness are consequently ignored in favor of expediency.
CPB would supplement the antiquated CST standard, which sac-
rifices fairness and autonomy for convenience. It is time for the
concept of legal competence to evolve and adapt to the changed
landscape of the criminal process.

